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Background 
 
Our work examines the relationship between knowledge/familiarity with shale gas and 
attitudes towards shale gas industry development in a comparative context.  The United States 
(US) and United Kingdom (UK) represent very different cases of shale gas development. Shale 
gas development is a relatively mature industry in the US, with extraction via hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”) occurring in many shale gas plays (e.g., the Marcellus in the Northeast, 
the Barnett in Texas, the Bakken in North Dakota, and others).  In direct contrast, although the 
UK does produce a small amount of onshore gas from other reservoir rocks, no extraction of 
shale gas has yet commenced; fewer than ten test wells (9 to be exact) have been drilled to date 
in the UK (http://frack-off.org.uk/extreme-energy-fullscreen/).1  Despite the lack of actual shale 
gas development,  dialogue about shale gas extraction has been no less lively in the UK (e.g., 
Bomberg 2015; Cotton 2014; Jaspal Williams et al. 2015) than in the US (Ashmore et al., 2016; 
Evensen et al., 2014; Vasi et al., 2015).  
 
Much of the conversation about shale gas development in the UK has tended to focus 
broadly on whether it will obtain positive or negative impacts and why (as opposed to how to 
manage specific aspects of development).  This conversation, thus, points to whether 
development should or should not occur (Bomberg, 2015; Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Wagner 
2015).  In the US, mass media discourse and community conversations often focus more 
frequently on nuances of how to deal with perceived positive and negative outcomes (Sovacool, 
2014; Stedman et al., 2012) of development than on whether to encourage or resist it. Because 
the evolution of shale gas development is still relatively early, the UK may have a great deal to 
learn from the US when considering whether and how to approach shale gas development, 
although several key differences need to be considered that reflect the different contexts in which 
development is occurring and/or may occur.   
 
There exist important contrasts between the US and the UK that suggest the need for 
comparative analysis.  These contrasts begin with private, dispersed vs. nationally concentrated 
ownership of mineral rights.  In much of the US, rights to subsurface resources are owned by the 
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 The website is for an activist group, but it is the preferred source of information for the government’s Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) on this topic 
landowner.  Especially in the Northeast US, where private land is relatively more abundant than 
the west, this means that it is quite common for individual private landowners to own the mineral 
rights.  As such, the potential for individual landowners to potentially profit economically from 
shale gas development is dramatic (see Kinnaman, 2011 for a cogent review). This profit 
potential is especially salient in contexts of persistent rural poverty. ‘Split estates’ (where the 
current or past landowner has sold the subsurface rights) are also relatively common (Anderson, 
2013), especially in the South and Midwest.  There also has been substantial development on 
government land—these government bodies then own the mineral rights in these contexts, and 
may enact additional regulations (Rahm and Riha, 2014). This is especially common in the 
western US, which is proportionately more dominated by public lands.   
 
The situation is comparatively much simpler in the UK: all mineral rights are vested to 
the Crown: although individual landowners may still receive some revenues from access fees, 
their potential economic returns are not of the magnitude found in the US.  This key difference 
can affect views of energy development, as landowners in shale gas extracting regions within the 
US potentially have much to gain through leasing their drilling rights (Bugden et al., 2016), thus 
potentially polarizing discourse and also resulting in greater framing of the issue in the US of one 
as potentially enhancing the well-being of rural people and communities in shale gas regions 
(e.g., Braiser et al., 2012; Considine et al., 2010).  While these economic benefits are far from 
agreed-upon (Schafft et al., 2013; Muehlenbachs, 2015), the point we wish to emphasize here is 
that the potential for these benefits has affected the discourse surrounding shale gas development 
(Fry et al., 2015) in a way that differs from the UK. 
 
This difference in ownership also means that mineral rights are leased in a highly 
decentralized manner in the US (Fitzgerald, 2010; Warner et al., 2013) with myriad individual 
landowners (or coalitions of landowners, see Jacquet and Stedman, 2011) making decisions 
across time and space.  The opposite occurs in the UK, where leasing happens at the national 
level and is conducted by the government via awarding of licenses covering vast areas.  This 
latter point will be re-engaged below.  Accompanying and complementing this decentralized 
leasing in the US is fragmented governance (Small et al., 2014).  In the US, states retain the 
majority of control over regulation; some have granted municipalities varying levels of oversight 
over development (e.g., Pennsylvania) while others have retained all governance capacity 
centrally (e.g., Ohio).  In the UK, with the exception of devolved powers to the Scottish 
Parliament, Parliament in Westminster has the ultimate authority over regulation. 2  
 
Governance has further shaped the stage on which shale gas-related discourse has played 
out.  As with ownership and governance, discourse has occurred much more at a national level in 
the UK compared with the US (Cotton et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2015).   The plurality and 
diversity of regulations in the US has fostered much more regionally-centered discourse in areas 
exposed to development or with the potential for development.  Also contributing to this 
relationship is the nature of the media: the print media in the UK it is overwhelmingly national, 
compared to viable local/regional print media in the US. Coupling this with the potential for rural 
development impacts of shale gas development has resulted in shale gas emerging as a very 
salient local/regional issue by local/regional/rural media (Ashmore et al., 2016; Evensen et al., 
2014; Theodori et al., 2014) in the US.  
 
In contrast, Williams et al. (2015) suggest that UK institutional actors have helped to 
create a more centralized discourse “…in which the policy approach is defined through a deficit 
model of public understanding of science and in which a technical approach to feasibility and 
safety is deemed as sufficient grounds for good [centralized] policymaking.”  They suggest (p.4) 
that this “supports a policy story-line (see Hajer, 1996) in which the sole legitimate barriers to 
achieving ‘real public support’ are seen to be a failure on the part of the public to recognise the 
benefits of fracking and to be reassured by institutional commitments to effective risk assessment 
and management.”  In this vein, Whitmarsh et al., 2015 (420) note that “The Royal Society 
(2012) concludes the safety and environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing are low and 
manageable through best practice and enforcement of UK regulations. They also recommend 
understanding public acceptability of shale gas extraction and use in the context of energy, 
environmental and economic policies be considered a priority for UK research.”   
 
In the UK, the science underlying hydraulic fracturing is seen as essentially sound; what 
is lacking is public recognition, understanding, and acceptance of this well-established, centrally 
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 Wales is also seeking authority to self-regulate shale gas development 
produced science. The implicit (at times explicit) framework here is that greater understanding 
will promote greater acceptance. Whitmarsh et al. continue, stating that the Royal Society also 
prioritizes understanding and fostering public acceptability of shale gas extraction and use. 
Similarly, the International Energy Agency concludes shale gas operators require a ‘social 
license to operate’ (see also O’Hara et al., 2014).  Specifically, one key goal of the UK Office of 
Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO) is to ‘support public engagement’, described as ‘helping 
people understand the facts about unconventional gas and oil production and what it could mean 
if it takes place in their area’ (DECC, 2013).  Williams et al., (2015) continue (p.4): “The UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron adopted this rhetoric when he suggested that ‘[i]f 
neighbourhoods can see the benefits – and are reassured about its effects on the environment – 
then I don’t see why fracking shouldn’t receive real public support’ (Cameron, 2013). Cotton et 
al., 2014 notes that the combination of central government rhetoric and growing grassroots 
activism makes shale gas a matter of national public policy debate, and notes Cameron’s 
emphasis (2013) in the Telegraph newspaper, stating: “Fracking has become a national debate in 
Britain – and it's one that I'm determined to win.”  
 
Literature Review 
 
Among the myriad comparisons between the US and the UK, which we could address, 
we focus in particular on the relationship between familiarity/knowledge about shale gas and 
support/opposition for development of the industry.   
 
Knowledge and Support for Shale Gas: Comparative Studies 
There is a well-established precedent for exploring the relationship between knowledge 
and support for shale gas development and how that relationship varies across contexts.  Within 
the North American context, there has been a robust body of work comparing perceptions of 
shale gas across states/provinces (Borick et al. 2013; Evensen et al., 2014a; Kromer, 2015; 
LaChapelle and Montpetit, 2014; Stedman et al., 2012) and within states (Ivacko and Horner, 
2014; Kriesky et al., 2013; Theodori, 2012).  Our study in particular builds upon previous work 
(e.g. Stedman et al., 2012; Brasier et al., 2011) that compared views of unconventional gas 
development across two US states within the Marcellus Shale region: New York, where there 
remains a statewide ban on drilling, and Pennsylvania, where drilling has been proceeding for a 
decade or more. The study (a mail survey) focused only on residents within the Marcellus shale 
region itself. Stedman et al. 2012, found (p.386)  “Despite nearly a decade of gas development in 
the Marcellus Shale region of Pennsylvania and the associated media coverage, respondents from 
both states generally reported knowing relatively little about the potential impacts of gas drilling. 
Moreover, the response patterns of Pennsylvania and New York residents did not differ 
significantly from one another in their self-assessed knowledge.”  Respondents in this study also 
expressed that they knew relatively little about particular elements of development, such as 
drilling procedures, legal implications of leasing, government regulations, environmental 
impacts, economic impacts, and other topics.  Again, the authors found that Pennsylvania and 
New York respondents did not differ in their self-assessed knowledge, despite the presumed 
differences in exposure to the industry.  Pennsylvania respondents in this study were also slightly 
more likely, on the whole, to support further shale gas development (47% vs 41% in New York).  
Although not willing to suggest a causal relationship between exposure and support, the study 
demonstrated that exposure to the industry (rather loosely operationalised, however, by residence 
in an active drilling play, versus not) is not associated with greater self-assessed knowledge, but 
is associated with slightly greater support.   
 
At least in a preliminary way, these findings suggest that more exposure does not 
necessarily lead to greater familiarity/knowledge, thus opening the door to making these 
comparisons at a broader scale: across nations.  An even more recent study in the UK 
(Whitmarsh at al., 2015), although not explicitly comparative across regions, echoed the policy 
rhetoric described earlier, finding a positive relationship between knowledge about shale gas 
development and positive attitudes/support for development. The researchers varied information 
experimentally and found that providing additional information to respondents was associated 
with more positive attitudes, regardless of whether the information was framed in positive or 
negative terms. 
 
Knowledge and Support of Risky Technology: The Information Deficit model and its discontents. 
Our review concatenates previous work on the relationship between knowledge and 
support of potentially risky technologies such as shale gas development.  Industries such as 
unconventional gas development can be framed as technological risks (Fischoff et al., 1978; 
Freudenburg and Pastor, 1992; Slovic, 2000, see Zoback et al., 2010 for an explicit framing of 
shale gas development in this vein).  Often, responses to technological risks, particularly 
oppositional responses, are analyzed as properties of individuals: i.e., through their use of 
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Freudenburg, 1992), or emotion (Slovic et al., 2004).   
Commonly, overcoming public opposition to such technological risks is thus seen as 
accomplished via cognitive-based models whereby attitudes are changed via the provision of 
information (Slovic et al., 2000).  This has come to be known as the “information deficit” (Gross, 
1994; Miller, 2001; Sturgis and Allum, 2004) or “educating the public” (Heberlein, 2012) model, 
whereby the provision of information about the risky technology or scientific enterprise is 
thought to allay concerns and generate support among a previously “irrational” public 
(Wandesman and Hallman, 1993).  Additional information, so the logic goes, helps to reduce this 
supposed irrationality.  This model therefore implicitly (or even explicitly) asserts that attitudes 
are based primarily on information, are relatively easy to change with the provision of additional 
information, and are tightly linked to relevant behavior (Heberlein, 2012).  
 
Miller (2001) asserts that that the deficit model fails to deliver on its promises. Sturgis 
and Allum (2004, p.56) note that “the deficit model has come in for sustained criticism on a 
number of grounds”, including the assumption that fear is primarily based on a lack of 
knowledge, neglecting that risks are given attention based on linkages to cultural assumptions 
(see Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982); biased measures used to measure knowledge; and the 
importance of social trust as underpinning risk. Heberlein (2012) confirms that most of the 
underlying assumptions he reveals regarding the relationship between information, attitudes, and 
behaviors do not hold up to scientific scrutiny: the public is often not irrational, nor are attitudes 
easily changed with the provision of additional information, nor are they often strongly related to 
risk-related behaviors (see also Peters, 2000).   
 
More broadly, numerous challenges have been raised regarding risk perceptions as the 
properties of individuals (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Kasperson, 1992; Rayner et al., 
1992; Renn et al., 2002; Wilkinson, 2001), but instead are culturally and socially rooted, noting 
the importance of social agreements in shaping what risks are selected for attention, but also the 
importance of social context in shaping these risks.  In moving towards what becomes their 
“contextualist” argument, Sturgis and Allum (2004, p.57) nicely articulate that [although these] 
“criticisms [of the deficit model] are undoubtedly in many ways valid, they do not, in our view, 
sufficiently problematize the deficit model to justify scrapping it entirely. Indeed, we find it 
puzzling that many scholars utilizing survey research methods that consistently uncover 
associations between knowledge of and attitudes towards science, despite controlling for a range 
of other important characteristics such as age, education, and social class, often choose to ignore 
this finding.”  
 
Research Rationale, Questions and Methods 
 
Rationale 
 
The contextualist perspective described above provides a solid foundation for our 
comparative approach to assessing the relationship between knowledge and attitudes.  Our 
engagement is based on our own healthy skepticism for the information deficit model: we agree 
with many of the theoretical critiques raised above, and note the results specific to shale gas 
development in the US that also challenge the assumptions of this model.  However, a different 
story seems to emerge in the UK sources engaged herein, where greater knowledge does appear 
to be linked to greater trust in science and concomitant perceived risk. We have also engaged 
how the shale gas question appears to manifest differently across the two contexts with respect to 
policy and media coverage, which—in the UK—appear to be tipped more towards concerted, 
concentrated efforts to gain increased acceptance.  Our research therefore engages the question 
of how context affects the relationship between, knowledge, and support.  We focus herein on 
the centralized discourse and programmatic efforts in the UK that emphasized educating the 
public about science in general and about shale gas development in particular. This institutional 
rhetoric within the UK fits well with the deficit model we engage: central authority in the UK 
has explicitly adopted an information deficit model that is explicitly pro-science and pro-shale 
gas.  This has been much less the case in the US with more decentralized (regional, state level) 
governance and no clear central message. 
 
Research Questions 
Emerging from the review above, we ask four questions in our work: 
1. What is the level of knowledge about shale gas development, and how does it differ between 
the general population of the US and the UK? 
2. What socio-demographic attributes are associated with knowledge?  
3. What is the overall level of support for shale gas development, and how does it differ 
between the general population of the US and the UK? 
4. What is the relationship between knowledge and support and how does it differ between the 
general population of the US and the UK? 
 
Research Methods 
Parallel questions were asked on two national level surveys, one each in the US and the 
UK. Within the UK, the University of (name removed for blind review) has been conducting a 
national survey since March 2012 (see name removed for blind review). At the time of our 
research, the survey had been administered 10 times between then and September 2014, and has 
allowed tracking of fine scale changes over time.  It has been administered through “YouGov” 
(https://yougov.co.uk/opi/), a panel sampling firm, resulting in nationally representative panel 
data3 (with respect to attributes such as gender, age, region, ethnicity, income).  The sample size 
has ranged from ~ 2500 to 3800 respondents per offering (table 1).  
Table 1: Administration Dates and Sample Size of UK Survey 
Date of survey # of respondents 
18th-20th March 2012 2784 
26th-30th April 2012 2791 
17th-19th June 2012 2687 
13th-14th December 2012 3530 
14th-18th March 2013 3697 
30th June-2nd July 2013 2126 
20th-24th September 2013 3688 
22nd-24th January 2014 3751 
11th-13th May 2014 3657 
9th-11th September 2014 3822 
                                                 
3  YouGov uses targeted quota sampling as opposed to random probability sampling. The software looks at 
all surveys that currently need panel members, and calculates how many people to send invites to every 30 minutes.  
Panel members are selected to meet certain survey requirements regarding sociodemographic characteristics. 
Sampling frames are drawn according to the population being researched, and will generally contain the same target 
quotas as desired by the research.   
 
 Within the United States, name removed for blind review University replicated key 
questions on the continuing UK YouGov survey conducted in September 2014 as part of a larger 
survey effort examining national perspectives on shale gas.  For our key variables—knowledge 
and support/opposition--we used the exact wording of the UK YouGov survey to maximize 
comparability.  This study utilized a Qualtrics panel (http://www.qualtrics.com/) of a nationally 
representative4 sample (n = 1625) regarding key comparison attributes of age, gender, and state-
by-state population distribution. 
 
The items that form the crux of our analysis include the following: Knowledge was 
measured via a multiple choice item “This is a fossil fuel, found in sedimentary rock normally 
more than 1000 metres below ground. It is extracted using a technique known as hydraulic 
fracturing, or 'fracking'. Is this fossil fuel:” a) Boromic gas, b) Coal, c) Xenon gas, d) Shale gas, 
e) Tar-sand oil, or f) Don't know. Prior to the US team’s involvement (prior to fall, 2014), UK 
respondents who answered incorrectly or responded that they did not know were excluded from 
the remainder of the survey.  At the request of the US researchers, the UK researchers agreed to 
change this protocol to retain those who answered incorrectly or stated that they did not know 
(otherwise, our assessment of the relationship between knowledge and support would be 
impossible).  
 
Support/opposition was also measured via a single item “Do you think that extracting 
natural gas from shale in the [UK/US] should or should not be allowed?”  In the UK, the 
response options with the a 3 category response metric: <1>  Should be allowed; <2>  Should 
NOT be allowed; <3>  Don’t know.  Because attitudes are nearly always more nuanced than 
                                                 
4 The US survey was not limited to the questions directly comparable between the US and UK but also 
explored a range of issues within the US.  Because shale gas drilling often occurs in places of relatively low 
population density, a simple random sample would have identified very few individuals living within or near a shale 
gas play.  We were interested in views among Marcellus Shale respondents in particular. As such, our initial sample 
included an oversample of residents living within the states of New York and Pennsylvania. We recognize, however, 
that such an oversample reduces our ability to compare the US and UK at a national level.  We therefore re-weighted 
our sample proportionately to account for the oversampling within the Marcellus shale region: Pennsylvania and 
New York respondents were re-weighted by 0.26 and 0.38, respectively, to account for their relative oversampling 
proportionate to their representation in the US population. 
 
simple dichotomies, this question was asked on a 5 category scale in the US: Do you think that 
extracting natural gas from shale in the United States should or should not be allowed?: <1> 
Definitely should be allowed; <2> Probably should be allowed; <3> Probably should NOT be 
allowed; <4>Definitely should NOT be allowed; <5> Don't know.  Following common practice 
(e.g., Sudman and Bradburn, 1986), the first 4 response options were compressed into 2 
categories that matched that those from the UK; “definitely” and “probably” should be allowed 
were combined into “should be allowed”, and definitely” and “probably” should not be allowed 
were combined into “should not be allowed”.  This allowed us to preserve the nuance of the 
attitudinal item for US based study, while maintaining comparability with the response items in 
the UK study. 
 
As our second research question addressed correlates of knowledge, we relate answering 
the knowledge question correctly to respondent socio-demographic attributes (e.g., gender, 
education, political ideology, and others), connectivity to the industry (region of residence, and 
in the US case, whether one had a lease on his/her property).  Although we were interested in the 
relationship between information sources and knowledge, we were unable to ask directly 
comparable items across the two surveys: the UK version of the survey only asked questions 
about what particular print media sources (all UK based) were read in general.  Clearly, 
replicating these items in the US would not have provided useful information, so we only explore 
socio-demographic correlates. 
 
Results 
 
What is the level of knowledge about shale gas development, and how does it differ between the 
general population of the US and the UK? 
 
UK respondents demonstrated far higher knowledge (as indicated by answering the item 
correctly) than US respondents.  Among US respondents, 33% answered correctly, 40% said that 
they did not know, and 27% answered incorrectly (table 2).  In the UK, 72% answered correctly, 
19% said they did not know and only 9% answered incorrectly. 
 
  
Table 2. Knowledge Differences between the US and the UK. 
 
 US Respondents UK Respondents 
 N (%) N (%) 
Shale Gas (Correct)  425 33.4 2766 72.3 
Boromic Gas  22 1.7 37 1.0 
Coal 188 14.7 227 5.9 
Xenon Gas 23 1.8 26 0.7 
Tar-sand Oil 107 8.4 54 1.4 
Don’t Know 510 40.0 714 18.7 
 
What are the socio-demographic attributes associated with knowledge? 
 
For both the US and the UK, we explore socio-demographic correlates of knowledge.  
Respondent characteristics were not asked in precise parallel fashion (i.e., categories of income, 
education, etc. are not identical across the countries).  Because of this lack of parallelism, and 
because it represents a relatively small portion of our analysis, we do not formally compare 
predictive models across the two study sites.  Rather, we explore these relationships via simple 
correlational analysis.  Within the US, answering correctly was positively associated (p<.05 for 
all variables listed below) with being male, older, more educated, having higher family income, 
living in a region where shale gas development was viewed as a salient topic (as defined by 
residing in a state with active shale gas development, or in a state [for example, New York] with 
intense media scrutiny and debate about whether development should move forward).  There was 
also a surprisingly modest, but significant at p<.05 relationship (r=.055) between knowledge and 
holding a current oil or gas lease on one’s property (table 3).   
 
Table 3. Correlates with Knowledge (answering correctly), US and UK  
 
 US Respondents UK Respondents 
 Pearson Sig (p<) Pearson Sig (p<) 
Gender -.196 .001 -.126 .000 
Age .073 .01 .081 .01 
Education .185 .001 .142 .001 
Income .102 .001 .116 .001 
Political Ideology 
-.005 ns n/a n/a 
Live in shale state .122 .001 n/a n/a 
Current lease .055 .05 n/a n/a 
The UK results followed a similar pattern to those observed in the US.  Increased 
knowledge was seen for (p<.05, for all relationships listed) older respondents, men, those with 
more income, and more education (while acknowledging that the particular categories for 
income and education were not a precise match).  Political ideology was not asked in a way 
comparable to the US (on a conservative/liberal spectrum), and questions about living in an area 
with an active shale gas play and having a lease on one’s property were not applicable to the UK 
context. 
 
What is the overall level of support for shale gas development, and how does it differ between the 
general population of the US and the UK? 
 
US respondents were overall much more supportive of shale gas development than UK 
residents (table 4).  A fairly sizeable majority (59%) of US respondents support shale gas 
development, compared to only 44% in the UK.  Some caution must be taken here; it is not that 
UK residents are more likely to oppose development; opposition levels are actually quite similar 
across the two study sites (27% of UK residents and 25% of US respondents oppose 
development). Rather, US respondents are much less likely than those from the UK to say that 
they do not know whether they support or oppose (17% vs 29%), raising interesting questions 
about the relationship between development trajectory and familiarity. 
 
Table 4.  Differences in Support/Opposition between the US and the UK. 
 
  UK  US 
Support  43.5%  58.9% 
Oppose  27.4%  24.5% 
Don’t know 29.1%  16.6% 
 
What is the relationship between knowledge and support and how does it differ between the 
general population of the US and the UK? 
 
We conducted a simple crosstab analysis within each country to explore this question 
(table 5). We see a very different relationship between support and knowledge across the two 
study sites: answering the knowledge question correctly is associated with increased support for 
development in the UK.  Those who answered correctly are twice as likely to support shale gas 
development (50.4%) as those who answered incorrectly5 (25.3%).  We also observe an 
important effect on ‘don’t know’ whether to support or oppose: UK respondents who answered 
incorrectly or did not know were more than twice as likely than those who answered correctly to 
say they did not know (53% versus 20%) whether they supported or opposed shale gas 
development.   
 
Table 5. Support and Knowledge, US and UK  
 
 UK Respondents Us Respondents 
 Answered 
Correctly 
Did not  Answered 
Correctly 
Did not  
Support  50.4% 25.3% 61.4% 57.6% 
Oppose  29.4% 22.0% 31.8% 20.8% 
Don’t 
know 20.1% 52.7% 6.8% 21.5% 
 
UK 
Pearson Chi-Square   404.4, 3df   p<.001 
Phi/Cramer’s V (Effect size)   .325 
US  
Pearson Chi-Square   51.4, 3df   p<.001 
Phi/Cramer’s V (Effect size)   .201 
 
A very different effect is observed in the US: there is no effect on support of answering correctly 
versus incorrectly/don’t know. We observe fairly strong support overall (about 60% of 
respondents), but this figure scarcely differs between those who answered correctly (61.4%) and 
those who did not (57.6%).  Counter to what was found in the UK, answering correctly was 
associated with (relatively) more opposition than the support: 32% who answered correctly were 
opposed, versus 21% of those incorrectly answering.  Finally, only 22% of US respondents with 
relatively low knowledge (answered incorrectly or stated “don’t know”) stated that they did not 
know whether they supported or opposed shale gas development.  This stands in stark contrast to 
what was found in the UK, where over 50% of those with low knowledge in the UK stated that 
they did not know whether they supported or opposed development. Only 7% of US respondents 
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patterns vis-à-vis support/opposition were very similar, thus we chose to combine them. 
who answered correctly stated that they did not know whether to support or oppose, versus 20% 
in the UK; in the UK, knowledge can still manifest in attitudinal uncertainty.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Robust differences exist between the US and UK respondents.  We found higher levels of 
knowledge (answering the screener question correctly) about the shale gas industry in the UK 
than in the US,, but higher levels of support in the US (opposition levels were similar across the 
two samples, but US respondents were much less likely than UK respondents to say that they did 
not know whether they supported or opposed development).  Regarding the relationship between 
knowledge and support, we see that increased knowledge in the UK is associated with increased 
support, while knowledge was unrelated to support in the US. UK respondents who did not 
answer the knowledge question correctly were very likely to say they did not know whether they 
supported or opposed development—it seems eminently reasonable that those who had incorrect 
information or realized they did not know the answer did not express strong support or 
opposition.  In stark contrast, more than half of the US respondents who did not answer correctly 
supported development.   
 
At this point it becomes reasonable to reflect on the adequacy of the knowledge question 
(correctly associating hydraulic fracturing / ‘fracking’ with ‘shale gas’) as reflecting knowledge.  
It seems sensible that anyone with a basic working knowledge of this topic would almost 
certainly be able to make this basic association; therefore, it is a good proxy for (at least limited) 
knowledge.  This simple measure reveals nothing about the process by which people become 
informed. .  It is also possible that the “shale gas” language resonates differently across the 
contexts, contributing to the results. The term ‘shale gas’ is virtually always used when 
discussing hydraulic fracturing in the UK.  In media coverage, the two are nearly 
interchangeable, even when technically inaccurate (e.g., hydraulic fracturing for coal bed 
methane) (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2011). In the US, Evensen et al. (2014) have noted a greater 
pluralism of terminology, with the term “fracking” often used to denote the entire process of 
shale gas development.  We do not wish to over-speculate on this possibility as the “shale gas” 
parlance is quite recognizable in the US as well (Ashmoore et al., 2016); future research 
certainly could explore the effects of experimentally varying the wording in survey instruments 
(Clarke et al.. 2015 did so on a US-focused study).  
 
That US respondents are only half as likely as those from the UK to say that they do not 
know whether they support or oppose further development raises interesting questions about the 
relationship between the trajectory of shale gas development and knowledge. Setting aside the 
possibility that this represents a more general cultural pattern of US survey respondents being 
less willing to admit to lack of knowledge, this finding also could be attributed to longer more 
extensive history of development in the US leading to familiarity. However, Stedman et al. 
(2012) found the opposite (longer pattern of development correlated to lower self-assessed 
knowledge) in their comparisons between New York and Pennsylvania.  Further, such a 
conclusion seems not in keeping with the finding that less knowledge is related to greater support 
among US respondents, nor that 72% answered the knowledge question correctly in the UK, 
whilst only half that number (36%) answered it correctly in the US.   
 
In turning back to the questions motivating our research, the information 
deficit/educating the public model, so oft castigated in academic research, seems—even with 
admittedly limited data—to hold up reasonably well in the UK: simply put, those who answer the 
question correctly are more supportive of industry.  This is the classic model promulgated by 
those who suggest the need to “educate the public” about risky technologies such as shale gas 
development, and is consistent with publically articulated national level policy around shale gas 
development in the UK.  Several caveats are important to engage.  First, as we have described, 
our measures of how people become informed are somewhat limited by the data at hand.  Further 
research is needed in this area. In the UK, in particular, we only had data available on the 
readership of particular newspapers in general (rather than other potential sources of information 
that might have been part of concerted efforts in the UK to educate people about science in 
general and shale gas in particular). Given the emphasis put on educating the UK public about 
science and technology, research reflecting more nuance on where people receive such 
information is crucial.  Second, the data in our study are limited in that we can only make our 
assessments here with single point in time information rather than conducting a longitudinal 
analysis or experiment where we would be able to view the effect of additional information on 
knowledge and support (as did Whitmarsh et al., 2015).  Again, we urge that other researchers 
carry forward this line of inquiry as the industry develops in both the US and the UK. 
 
Further, consistent with our expectations emerging from the relative centralization of 
governance and discourse—much more concentrated and purposeful in the UK—evidence 
supporting the information deficit model is notably absent for US respondents, where those not 
answering correctly were disproportionately likely to support further development. Why does a 
relative lack of knowledge translate into support rather than opposition (or, more reasonably, at 
least uncertainty, as is seen in the UK data)?  From the standpoint of the data we have available, 
we cannot trace the source of this difference. We might ask whether there is something 
qualitatively different about the nature of the information that people have access to—
information perhaps with a more positive valence in the UK, as suggested by the rhetoric from 
the Cameron administration and related efforts to engender support.  The centralized assurance 
found in the UK that the science around shale gas development is sound and that the technology 
is safe is notably absent in the US, where there is no strong central reassuring voice.  Rather, we 
see a near cacophony of claims and counter-claims about the safety, benefits, and harms of the 
industry.   
 
Finally, it is also reasonable to surmise that the previously discussed media linkage 
between shale gas development and jobs, economic prosperity, and energy independence 
resonates strongly, perhaps disproportionately so, among those relatively less knowledgeable. 
That US respondents who expressed low knowledge were still willing to express an opinion, and 
a supportive one at that, could indicate that they are disproportionately focused on potential 
benefits, rather than risks, of shale gas development, and that these views are not strongly tied to 
knowledge.  Other research using this data set (name withheld for blind review, 2016) supports 
this claim, indicating that on the whole, US respondents were more likely than UK respondents 
to associate shale gas with positive outcomes such as cheap energy, clean energy, and energy 
security; UK respondents were more likely to associate shale gas with negative outcomes such as 
earthquakes.  The source of these associations deserves further exploration with additional items 
that test the dimensionality of attitudes, and the source of knowledge.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Funding for this research was provided by federal formula funds from the US Department of 
Agriculture, administered through (name withheld for blind review) University, and by the 
(name withheld for blind review) Group at the University of (name withheld for blind review).   
 
We would also like to thank YouGov for their support in survey administration within the UK 
and Jessica Andersson-Hudson for her invaluable assistance in data coding and manipulation. 
 
Funding for this research was provided via fellowship funding from the US Environmental 
Protection Agency and via a federal formula funds grant from XXX (institution removed for peer 
review).   
 
 
 
 
  
Literature Cited 
 
Anderson, P. (2013). Reasonable accommodation: split estates, conservation easements, and 
drilling in the Marcellus Shale. Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 31, 136. 
 
Ashmoore, O., D. Evensen, C. Clarke, J. Krakower, & J. Simon. (2016). Regional newspaper 
coverage of shale gas development across Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania: Similarities, 
differences, and lessons. Energy Research and Social Science 11, 119-132. 
 
Bickle, M., Goodman, D., Mair, R., Roberts, R., Selley, R. C., Shipston, Z., Thomas, H., & 
Younger, P. (2012). Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: A Review of Hydraulic Fracturing. Royal 
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, London 
 
Bomberg, E. (2015).  Shale we drill? Discourse dynamics in UK fracking debates. Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning (published online before print), 1-17. 
 
Borick, C., Rabe, B., & LaChapelle, E. (2014) Public perceptions of shale gas extraction and 
hydraulic fracturing in New York and Pennsylvania. Issues in Energy and Environmental Policy 
14, 1-18. 
 
Brasier, K., M. Filteau, D. McLaughlin, J. Jacquet, R. C. Stedman, T. Kelsey, & S. Goetz.  
(2011). Residents’ Perceptions of Community and Environmental Impacts from Marcellus Shale. 
Rural Social Studies 26(1) 32–61. 
 
Bugden, D., D.L. Kay, R. Glynn, & R.C. Stedman. (2016). The bundle below: understanding 
unconventional oil and gas development through analysis of lease agreements. Energy Policy 92, 
214-219.   
 
Cameron, D. (2013). We cannot afford to miss out on shale gas. The Telegraph, 11 August. 
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10236664/We-cannot-afford-to-miss-out-
on-shale-gas.html. 
 
Clarke, C.E., P.S. Hart, J. P. Schuldt, D.T.N. Evensen, H.S. Boudet, J.B. Jacquet, & R.C. 
Stedman.  2015. Public opinion on energy development: The interplay of issue framing, top-of-
mind associations, and political ideology.  Energy Policy 8,131-140. 
 
Considine, T. J., Watson, R., & Blumsack, S. (2010). The economic impacts of the Pennsylvania 
Marcellus shale natural gas play: an update. The Pennsylvania State University, Department of 
Energy and Mineral Engineering. 
 
Cotton, M., Rattle, I., & Van Alstine, J. (2014). Shale gas policy in the United Kingdom: An 
argumentative discourse analysis. Energy Policy 73, 427-438. 
 DECC  2013.  New office to look at community benefits for shale gas projects (Press Release), 
20 March.  Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-office-to-look-at-
community-benefits-forshale-gas-projects. 
 
Douglas, M., & A. Wildavsky. (1982). Introduction: Can we know the risks we face? In Risk and 
Culture. Chapter 1.  (pp 1-15). University of California Press. 
 
Evensen, D. T., Clarke, C. E., & R. C. Stedman. (2014). A New York or Pennsylvania state of 
mind: social representations in newspaper coverage of gas development in the Marcellus Shale. 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 4(1), 65-77. 
 
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S. & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe 
enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits. Policy 
sciences 9(2), 127-152. 
 
Fitzgerald, T. (2010). Evaluating split estates in oil and gas leasing. Land Economics 86, 294–
312. 
 
Freudenburg, W. R. (1992). Heuristics, biases, and the not-so-general public: Expertise and error 
in the assessment of risks. In Social Theories of Risk (Krimsky, S., & D. Golding ed., pp 259-
250) Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Freudenburg, W. R. & Pastor, S. K. (1992). Public responses to technological risks: Toward a 
sociological perspective. Sociological Quarterly, 389-412. 
 
Fry, M., Briggle, A., & Kincaid, J. (2015) Fracking and environmental (in)justice in a Texas city. 
Ecological Economics 117, 97-107. 
 
Gross, A. (1994).  The roles of rhetoric in the public understanding of science.  Public 
Understanding of Science 3(3), 3-23. 
 
Heberlein, T. A. (2012). Navigating environmental attitudes. Oxford University Press. 
 
IEA. (2012). Golden rules for a golden age of gas: WEO special report. International Energy 
Agency; 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/WEO2012_GoldenRul
esReport.pdf 
 
Ivacko, T., & Horner, D. (2014). Fracking as a community issue in Michigan. Michigan Public 
Policy Survey 1-14. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446525. Accessed on 6 January 2016. 
 
Jacquet, J., & R.C. Stedman.  (2011). Emergence of landowner coalitions in Marcellus Shale. 
Rural Social Studies. 26(1), 62–91. 
 
Jaspal, R. & Nerlich, B. (2014).  Fracking in the UK press: Threat dynamics in an unfolding 
debate. Public Understanding of Science 23, 348-363. 
 
Kasperson, R. (1992).  The social amplification of risk: progress in developing an integrative 
framework. In Social Theories of Risk. (Krimsky, S., & D. Golding ed., pp 153-178) Westport, 
CT: Praeger. 
 
Kinnaman, T. C. (2011). The economic impact of shale gas extraction: A review of existing 
studies. Ecological Economics 70, 1243–1249. 
 
Kriesky, J., Goldstein, B., Zell, K., & Beach, S. (2013). Differing opinions about natural gas 
drilling in two adjacent counties with different levels of drilling activity. Energy Policy 58, 228-
236. 
 
Kromer, M. (2015) Public perceptions of hydraulic fracturing in three Marcellus Shale states. 
Issues in Energy and Environmental Policy 20, 1-12. 
 
LaChapelle, E., & Montpetit, E. (2014). Public opinion on hydraulic fracturing in the province of 
Quebec: A comparison with Michigan and Pennsylvania. Issues in Energy and Environmental 
Policy 17, 1-21. 
 
Peters, H. P. (2000). From Information to Attitudes? Thoughts on the Relationship between 
Knowledge about Science and Technology and Attitudes toward Technology. In Between 
Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology (M. Dierkes, & C. von Grote ed., 
pp 265-286). Amsterdam: Harwood. 
 
O’Hara, S., Humphrey, M., Andersson, J., Jaspal, R., Nerlich, B., & Knight W. (2014). Public 
perception of shale gas extraction in the UK: has Balcombe bottomed out?; 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/131787519/public-perceptions-of-shalegas- 
in-the-UK-September-2014-pdf. 
 
Miller, S. (2001).  Public understanding of science at the crossroads.  Public Understanding of 
Science 10, 115–120. 
 Muehlenbachs, L.A. (2015). The housing market impacts of shale gas development.  American 
Economic Review 105(12), 3633-3659. 
 
Rahm, B.G.& Riha, S.J., (2014). Evolving shale gas management: water resource risks, impacts, 
and lessons learned. Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts, 16(6), 1400-1412. 
 
Rayner, S. (1992).  Cultural theory and risk analysis. In Social Theories of Risk (Krimsky, S., & 
D. Golding ed., pp 83-116) Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Renn, O., C. Jaeger, E. Rosa, & T. Webler. (2000). The rational actor paradigm in risk theories: 
Analysis and critique. In Risk in the Modern Age: Social Theory, Science, and Environmental 
Decision-Making (M. Cohen ed. pp 35-61). New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Royal Society. (2012). Shale gas extraction in the UK: a review of hydraulic fracturing. London: 
The Royal Society. 
 
Schafft, K. A., Borlu, Y. & Glenna, L., (2013). The relationship between Marcellus Shale gas 
development in Pennsylvania and local perceptions of risk and opportunity. Rural Sociology, 
78(2) 143-166. 
 
Schultz, P. W., (2002). Knowledge, information, and household recycling: Examining the 
knowledge-deficit model of behavior change. In New tools for environmental protection: 
Education, information, and voluntary measures. (pp 67-82). 
 
Slovic, P. (1986). Informing and educating the public about risk. Risk Analysis, 6(4) 403-415. 
 
Slovic, P. (2000). The Perception of Risk. Earthscan publications. 
 
Slovic, P., B. Fischoff, & S. Lichtenstein. (2000). Cognitive processes and societal risk taking. In 
The Perception of Risk (Slovic, P. ed pp 32-50) Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications. 
 
Slovic, P., M. Finucanse, E. Peters, & D. G. MacGregor. (2004). Risk as analysis and risk as 
feelings: some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality.  Risk Analysis 24(2) 311-322. 
 
Sovacool, B. (2014) Cornucopia or curse? Reviewing the costs and benefits of shale gas 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 37, 249-264. 
 
Stedman, R. C., J. B. Jacquet, M. R. Filteau, F. K. Willits, K. J. Brasier, & D. K. McLaughlin. 
(2012). Marcellus Shale Gas Development and New Boomtown Research: Views of New York 
and Pennsylvania Residents. Environmental Practice, 14(4), 382-393. 
 
Sturgis, P. & Allum, N. (2004). Science in society: re-evaluating the deficit model of public 
attitudes. Public Understanding of Science, 13(1) 55-74. 
 
Sudman, S., & N.M. Bradburn (1986).  Asking Questions: A Practical Guide to Questionnaire 
Design.   San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Theodori, G. (2012). Public perception of natural gas industry: Data from the Barnett Shale. 
Energy Sources, Part B 7, 275-281. 
 
Tversky, A. & D. Kahneman. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 
Science, 185. 
 
Wandersman, A. H. & Hallman, W. K. (1993). Are people acting irrationally? Understanding 
public concerns about environmental threats. American Psychologist, 48(6), 681. 
 
Wagner, A. (2015) Shale gas: Energy innovation in a (non-)knowledge society: A press 
discourse analysis. Science and Public Policy 42, 273-286. 
 
Warner, B., & J. Shapiro. (2013). Fractured, Fragmented Federalism: A Study in Fracking 
Regulatory Policy. Publius, the Journal of Federalism 43, 474–496  
 
Whitmarsh, L., Nash, N., Upham, P., Lloyd, A., Verdon, J. P., & Kendall, J. M. (2015). UK 
public perceptions of shale gas hydraulic fracturing: The role of audience, message and 
contextual factors on risk perceptions and policy support. Applied Energy 160, 419-430. 
 
Wilkinson, I. (2001). Social theories of risk perception: At once indispensable and insufficient. 
Current Sociology 49(1) 1-22.   
 
Williams, L., Macnaghten, P., Davies, R. & Curtis, S. (2015) Framing ‘fracking’: Exploring 
public perceptions of hydraulic fracturing in the United Kingdom. Public Understanding of 
Science (published online before print), 1-17. 
 
Zoback, M., Kitasei, S. and Copithorne, B., (2010). Addressing the Environmental Risks from 
Shale Gas Development (Vol. 21). Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. 
